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I. INTRODUCTION
Nations, like children, are each exceptional in their own way. This Article challenges the prevailing view that the United States acts exceptionally by examining the insufficiently considered legal exceptionalism of other countries. A nation that is "exceptional" seeks to apply a legal rule for itself that differs from an existing or emerging international norm as reflected in a multilateral treatybehavior that might be called, in the words of Harold Koh, pursuit of a double standard. 1 This definition of legal exceptionalism differs 1.
Koh identifies the pursuit of double standards as the most problematic side of American exceptionalism. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1485-87 (2003) . Here, the United States seeks a norm for itself that differs from the international norm. Id. This Article focuses exclusively on legal exceptionalism in the context of multilateral agreements. I do not consider exceptionalism in the context of customary international law, as indicated, for example, by whether a country objects to a customary international norm. Jonathan Charney notes that the persistent objector rule that enables a country to avoid the application of a customary international norm by persistently objecting to it is rarely used. (similarly restricting her analysis of states' commitment to international law to treaties). The vast number of international multilateral agreements presents a broader spectrum of norms against which to analyze exceptionalism. Moreover, multilateral agreements arise from international negotiations that more readily reveal a country's exceptional positions. Finally, most of the criticism against the United States stems from its failure to join multilateral enterprises rather than from its having excepted itself from customary international law.
from the historical understanding of American exceptionalism, credited to Alexis de Tocqueville, which refers to the United States' perception that it differs qualitatively from other nations due to its unique history, origins, and special political institutions, and that it serves as a beacon to other nations. 2 The attitude and policies of the George W. Bush Administration have increased and amplified allegations of the United States' legal exceptionalism. 3 However, concern over U.S. legal exceptionalism and unilateralism predates the Bush Administration and will likely persist after it. 4 The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the world's sole superpower and unleashed a growing torrent of international and academic concern over U.S. legal exceptionalism. A search of English-language law review articles published between 1990 and 2006 identified 732 articles referencing "American exceptionalism" and 45 discussing "U.S." or "United States" "exceptionalism." 5 An additional 294 articles referred to "American unilateralism," "U.S. unilateralism," or "United States unilateralism." 6 Law schools, law journals, and prestigious legal academic societies have devoted entire symposia and panels to the abound. 11 The countries of Europe, to take one example, are perceived to differ dramatically from the United States, as evidenced by works entitled The Better Peoples of the United Nations, 12 The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective, 13 and The United Nations and Europe: An Even Stronger Partnership. 14 From the perspective of scholarly concern, other nations appear to join an international community of norms and institutions, while the United States goes its own way. 15 A rich body of scholarship exists as to when nations assume international obligations or when they comply with existing ones. The debate tends to the theoretical, with scholars congregating into doctrinal camps.
These include the realist, 16 857, 857 (2004) (noting the widespread belief of European peoples and governments that Europeans are "the better peoples of the United Nations" and their absolute conviction of their "UN virtuousness," but questioning some of this self-assessment).
13. Bernhard Jensen, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (2000) ("The European approach to unilateralism is characterized by extreme prudence and limited flexibility with regard to attempts by individual states to usurp the role of 'world policeman.'").
14. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN EVEN STRONGER PARTNERSHIP (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2006); see also SERGIO FABBRINI, THE UNITED STATES CONTESTED: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND EUROPEAN DISCONTENT 97 (2006) (noting a "creeping alienation that has affected public opinion and public discourse on both sides of the Atlantic"). A search conducted on Amazon.com on July 12, 2007, revealed thirty-six books and manuscripts with American exceptionalism in the title and another six with American unilateralism in the title. In sharp contrast, Amazon.com did not list a single book or manuscript with European exceptionalism or European unilateralism in its title.
15. Even in the realm of sports, the United States faces criticism for its exceptional behavior as it proves unwilling to join the international community's greatest passion-soccer. 17. Like the realists, the constructivists believe that states are interest-based actors; however, unlike the realists, constructivists do not see states as rigidly seeking the same goals of power, security, and wealth. Instead, international surroundings influence or "construct" states and their interests. HATHAWAY & KOH, supra note 16, at institutionalist, 18 and liberal theorist camps. 19 More recently, scholars like Oona Hathaway and Beth Simmons have injected some empirical analysis into the question of when nations assume or comply with international norms. 20 This Article uses case studies to examine the concept of legal exceptionalism. In doing so, it paints a more nuanced and useful picture of exceptionalism in international law than that prevalent in current international scholarship, seeking to add to the theoretical and numbers-based empirical approaches of existing scholarship. The Article argues that most countries seek different international rules for themselves when they perceive themselves to have an exceptional need. Indeed, in cases of exceptional need, numerous countries believe themselves entitled to exceptional legal accommodation and may even perceive other countries' unwillingness to accommodate their need as unfair.
Most scholarship on legal exceptionalism takes a fairly binary approach: Has a country acceded to a convention, or, in the alternative, has it refused to join or joined but excepted itself from some of the treaty's norms by using reservations? 21 Compliance scholarship also assesses compliance in terms of whether a country fulfills its obligations as enumerated under a treaty. 22 Most of the criticism leveled against the United States stems from its refusal to join agreements, and, particularly in the human rights context, making its accession contingent on a series of reservations. 23 This Article broadens the analysis of legal exceptionalism to include situations where a country or a group of countries seek a special or different legal norm for themselves during the process of negotiating a treaty and succeed in obtaining this legal accommodation. Having obtained this built-in accommodation, they can join the treaty; they need not file a reservation because the treaty already addresses their special interests; and, having had their special interests expressly accommodated, they can better comply with the norms that they have accepted. Politically, the situation of a country that joins a treaty and enjoys both the benefit of built-in exceptions and the international acclaim of participating in the treaty differs dramatically from a country that does not join and faces the possibility of international criticism. 24 However, with respect to double-standards, no compelling legal normative reason exists to distinguish, as a matter of course, between built-in exceptionalism and the exceptionalism of abstaining from a treaty or joining one subject to a reservation. In each case, a country excepts itself from a uniform international rule. Admittedly, in the case of built-in exceptionalism, the international community has sanctioned the differential treatment. However, in assessing, let alone excoriating, legal exceptionalism, we should not automatically distinguish between the two situations. International law permits countries to abstain from treaties or to join with reservations just as much as it permits built-in exceptions. The difference between countries that obtain built-in exceptions and those that do not often simply reflects discrepancies in their respective bargaining power in multilateral 21 .
E.g., Ignatieff, supra note 8, at 3-7. negotiations rather than discrepancies in the merits of their underlying claims for differential treatment.
Part II explores U.S. exceptionalism in the context of the 1997 Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines (the Landmines Convention). Part III points to the exceptional position taken by the European Union in various international agreements and international organizations to accommodate its unique and evolving status. Part IV considers developing country exceptionalism in seeking common but differentiated responsibilities in international environmental agreements and in trade agreements.
This analysis reveals that, while not exclusively the case, U.S. exceptionalism often flows from its perceived military needs and unique global security responsibilities. Overall, we can expect the United States to expect accommodation when an agreement raises significant military issues for it. European exceptionalism grows out of Europe's unique status as a quasi-state or quasi-multi-state negotiating bloc. Europe will often seek special international rules for itself when issues involving the European Union and its relationship with its member states arise. Developing country exceptionalism flows from developing countries' special economic needs.
We can expect developing countries often to demand international norm accommodation when an agreement involves economic obligations or has an impact upon development.
Harold Koh levels his strongest criticism against the United States in situations where the United States seeks a rule for itself that differs from the rule that applies to the rest of the world. 25 In this zenith of exceptional behavior, he considers the United States to appear as an international hypocrite. 26 The United States, however, hardly stands alone in this objectionable conduct. As shown below, there is nothing exceptional about hypocrisy in international norm formation.
This Article does not defend U.S. exceptionalism per se. Rather, it puts U.S. exceptionalism in perspective by analyzing the exceptionalism of other countries.
If most countries seek international double standards in certain situations, exceptionalism in international law is unexceptional. The question moving forward thus becomes what, if anything, to do about exceptionalism in international law. This Article thus concludes by briefly identifying some parameters for future work on the proper place for exceptionalism in international law. The Article suggests that certain situations call for exceptional legal accommodation, and the community of nations should continue to fashion double standards to meet bona fide special needs. Nations, however, should avoid 25.
Koh, supra note 1, at 1485-87; accord Sands, supra note 23, at 90. 26.
Koh, supra note 1, at 1487.
according special treatment to a country or a group of countries as a matter of course based on their inherent status or position with little regard to identified special needs in a particular treaty. They also should refuse to extend special legal accommodation beyond that necessary to address the special need at hand. They should eschew according special treatment to countries that participate in negotiations to develop norms for others while simultaneously seeking to exempt themselves from most of a treaty's obligations or core requirements. Indeed, a country's or group of countries' use of international law to bind other nations but not themselves represents the most problematic form of legal exceptionalism. The Article further argues that the present lopsided focus on U.S. exceptionalism is dangerous. Such a focus particularly benefits European nations, which at times use international law to isolate the United States in order to compete with it economically and politically rather than using international law to address global problems meaningfully. The characterization of the United States as a persistent objector to international law not only discourages meaningful discourse with the United States and leads to less effective agreements without its support, but it also causes the United States actively to oppose certain international agreements. Overall, the unbalanced criticism of the United States, coupled with the international and scholarly emphasis on headcounts of state accession to treaties, threatens the bedrock of peaceful international norm evolution-that is, negotiated consensus between states that addresses the bona fide interests and concerns of the negotiating parties. Over the long run, treaties that obtain high levels of accession by small and medium states but leave important powers like the United States outside of the treaty regime fall short of addressing international problems and achieving comity between nations.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT U.S. EXCEPTIONALISM
This Part begins where current scholarship on U.S. exceptionalism generally leaves off. 27 It asks what situations will 27 .
Recent scholarship has analyzed the roots of U.S. legal exceptionalism. Jed Rubenfeld explains the differences between U.S. and European attitudes toward international law in terms of their respective histories. He argues that the United States is less likely to join international norms because it understood World War II to vindicate its way of life, values, and popular democracy. Europe, in contrast, viewed World War II as a powerful condemnation of popular sovereignty, with international law serving as a much-needed constraint on popular democracy. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1985-87. Delahunty disagrees with Rubenfeld, finding the roots of difference in self-interest. Robert J. Delahunty, The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why Do American likely cause the United States to act exceptionally by either refusing to accede to an emerging or existing international legal norm or by seeking a special accommodation for itself that may amount to a double standard in the problematic way identified by Koh. This Part argues that U.S. exceptionalism will often arise in situations where the international norm significantly impinges upon the United States' perceived special international security responsibilities. When faced with an international regime that presents significant military hardship, the United States will not only seek exceptional legal treatment and refuse to join an agreement that fails to address its needs, but it will also consider its unique global military obligations and exposure to justify its posture. Although not the focus of this Part, another situation that will regularly trigger an exceptional response by the United States is a treaty or an emerging international norm that implicates constitutional rights or the constitutional relationship between the federal government and the Several States.
The United States will usually abstain from international agreements, such as those in the area of human rights, that raise constitutional or federalism issues or, in the alternative, will only join the accords with reservations. (1) human-rights narcissism, where the United States embraces its own First Amendment political rights but not economic rights accepted by the rest of the world; (2) judicial exceptionalism, where courts consider the sentiments of other foreign courts and jurisdictions irrelevant to U.S. constitutional interpretation; and (3) U.S. exemptionalism, where the United States exempts itself from international rules by not joining agreements, by not complying with agreements, or by joining with reservations and understandings. Ignatieff, supra note 8, at 3-11. Koh teases out four facets of U.S. exceptionalism, "in order of ascending opprobrium": (1) distinctive rights, where the United States protects certain rights such as speech more than other countries; (2) the "use of different labels to describe synonymous" international legal concepts; (3) the "flying buttress mentality," where the United States complies with treaties, particularly human rights agreements, which it does not join; and (4) scholars make a strong argument that the treaty or emerging international norm does not violate the Constitution, the mere fact that it raises serious constitutional issues-which, in the case of a treaty, will likely emerge during the ratification process-will make the United States much less likely to agree to the norm or more likely to seek an exception to address the constitutional concerns. 29 The 1997 Ottawa Landmines Convention provides a good case study of U.S. legal exceptionalism. Many international law scholars and practitioners regard the Landmines Convention as one of the two smallarms/statements/usE.html ("The United States will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures abrogating the Constitutional right to bear arms.").
If an international norm requires the federal government to impinge upon responsibilities generally reserved to the states, the United States will be less likely to join or to comply with the international norm. to remove the mines along the North Korea-South Korea border. 48 NGOs and other nations rejected this proposal as well. 49 The United States also unsuccessfully sought an exclusion for its system of preventing the dismantling of anti-tank mines comparable to the exclusion secured by other nations. 50 The United States refrained from joining the Landmines Convention not because of its exceptional approach to international law, but because the Convention failed to address the United States' perceived special military needs. As President Clinton lamented:
One of the biggest disappointments I've had as President, a bitter disappointment for me, is that I could not sign in good conscience the treaty banning land mines, because we have done more since I've been President to get rid of land mines than any country in the world by far. We spend half of the money the world spends on de-mining. We have destroyed over a million of our own mines.
I couldn't do it because the way the treaty was worded was unfair to the United States and to our Korean allies in meeting our responsibilities along the DMZ in South Korea, and because it outlawed our anti-tank mines while leaving every other country [sic] intact. And I thought it was unfair. 51
Moreover, a close look at the Landmines Convention reveals that many nations who, like the United States, could identify a specific security threat that they believed necessitated the use of landmines did not join the Convention. U.S. refusal to join thus remains unexceptional even when assessed within the confines of the Convention itself. Of the thirty-nine countries that have not joined the Convention, most could identify a particular border which they 51. White House Press Release, supra note 50. The much-maligned refusal by the United States to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) also flows in part from her sensitivity to the exceptional exposure that her troops face given their presence in numerous theaters from Kosovo to Haiti to Somalia to Korea and the potential that the Court could be used as a political weapon against her. Delahunty, supra note 27, at 44. As with the Landmines Convention, before the U.S. refused to join the ICC, it sought built-in exceptions to address her perceived special needs, including, for example, an exception for U.S. military forces in the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. exact-either did not agree to eliminate stockpiles or agreed to eliminate them but had none to destroy. With respect to clearing existing landmines, the overwhelming majority of parties had none to clear. 64 Of the eighty-eight countries that had landmines to clear, 65 approximately thirty-four, or 39%, refused to join the Convention. 66 Of the fifty-one countries with landmines that did join the Convention, 67 many-such as Bosnia, Colombia, and many African countries-did not perceive an existing need to use the landmines. 68 Clearing the landmines reflected a much-needed, historic cleanup for which these countries would seek, and receive, financial and material assistance, including from the United States. 69 As for the production of landmines, most countries that produce landmines did not join the Convention and most that joined do not produce. 73 Overall, countries that could identify a threat to security for which they considered the use of landmines necessary did not join the Landmines Convention. The refusal by the United States to join the Convention, while exceptional as to Andorra, Monaco, France and Spain, hardly proves exceptional when compared to many, if not most, countries in positions similar to that of the United States. 74 More importantly, U.S. insistence on an exception to accommodate its special obligations in Korea is not exceptional when compared, as in Part III below, with the demands by other countries to address their perceived special circumstances.
III. EUROPEAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Much of the disproportionate focus on U.S. legal exceptionalism stems from concern and fear of a sole superpower unbridled by international legal constraints. 75 The Soviet Union's collapse, however, heralded not only an increase in U.S. global power but also the dramatic ascendancy of a united, larger, and more powerful European Union (the Union or EU). Although there are no recorded mined areas in mainland France, it has treaty obligations in respect of any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control elsewhere. France announced that it planned to initiate clearance of antipersonnel mines around its ammunition depot in Djibouti in October 2006, more than seven years after becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Id.
73. See Landmine Monitor, Spain, in LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2006, supra note 52 (reporting that Spain had 853,286 anti-personnel mines when joining the Convention, and that it had completed its destruction of its stockpiles on October 3, 2000).
74. If anything, rather than reflecting exceptional conduct, the refusal by the United States to join the Landmines Convention appears consistent with Oona Hathaway's general observation that "the more likely a state is to change its behavior to comply with a treaty, the more reluctant it will be to commit to it in the first place." Integrated Theory, supra note 1, at 492. 79. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 2009-10 (noting that U.S. exceptionalism would not be that exceptional were it not for Europe's internationalism). The dearth of scholarship on European unilateralism reflects the perception of Europe's multilateralism. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Not only did the search conducted on Amazon.com on July 12, 2007 reveal, as mentioned earlier, not a single book with "European unilateralism" in its title, it identified only seven works addressing the topic at all. By contrast, the search unearthed 356 books and papers containing as a key term "American unilateralism." relationship with its members. These exceptional accommodations, on which this Part elaborates below, include: (1) regional economic integration organization provisions that enable the EU to join multilateral agreements and to participate in international institutions, as well as structural accommodations that give the EU and its members disproportionate influence at international negotiations and institutions; (2) built-in exceptions in multilateral treaties that accommodate EU interests; and (3) "mixed-agreements" that leave it ambiguous whether the EU or its member states bear responsibility for the implementation of and compliance with the treaties.
As a whole, these accommodations have received little attention in legal scholarship. Yet, they represent one of the most important, dramatic, and consistent exceptional treatments accorded by the international community to any nation or group of nations. 80 The exceptions granted to the European Union and its members enable them to act as one entity or as many states, whatever suits them best. E pluribus unum; ex uno plures. Enjoying both the advantages of a unified, state-like entity and the votes of many states, the European Union and its members have come to dominate multilateral treaty negotiations and, hence, emerging international legal norms. 81
A. Regional Economic Integration Organization Provisions and Participation in International Bodies
Treaties and international bodies have long been the province of states. While some exceptions exist, ordinarily only states negotiate and join international agreements. 82 International organizations, 80 .
The status and power accorded to the permanent five members of the Security Council-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-stands as the most exceptional treatment enjoyed by any group of nations. See Fassbender, supra note 12, at 871-72 (discussing the treatment and privileges afforded to the permanent members of the Security Council The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at session of the Conference of the Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Today, multilateral agreements routinely contain "regional economic integration organization" (REIO) clauses. These clauses are proposed by and designed specifically for the EU. 91 Indeed, as of June 2007, not a single entity other than the EU appeared to have joined a multilateral agreement pursuant to a REIO clause. REIO clauses typically define a REIO as "an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by [the agreement] and which has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it." 92 A REIO 87.
Id
The EU vs. EC distinction is confusing. The European Union was created in 1993 and includes as one of its key components the previously existing European Community. The European Union refers, inter alia, to the overall confederation of the twenty-seven member states and to the Communities of the Union to which all member states also belong. The European Community constitutes the principal of these communities. Thus, the term European Community still exists but now refers to one of the communities of the European Union. Although the European Community continues to join and negotiate most treaties on behalf of the EU, for simplicity's sake this Article will use "EU" when discussing EU or EC participation in international bodies and its negotiation and accession to treaties. provision allows the EU to join the treaty, 93 to vote on treaty matters falling within its competence, 94 to participate in the meetings of the parties to the treaty and in subsidiary bodies of the treaty, such as expert groups, 95 to interpret treaty text, and otherwise to partake fully in the treaty regime. The EU finds its participation and influence typically bounded only by restrictions on the EU casting a vote in addition to those cast by its members-for matters within its competence, the EU often casts the votes of its member states, who may not then cast individual votes 96 -and by limitations on its legal authority under EU law. 97 Having entered a treaty regime or an international organization or body as a full participant, and even in the case of United Nations bodies in which the EU participates as an observer only, 98 the EU and its members enjoy disproportionate influence due to exceptional accommodations that preserve their benefits as a group of individual states, notwithstanding their legally-mandated, unified foreign policy on a range of matters. To appreciate fully the extensive power enjoyed by the EU and its members, one must understand the organizational structure of international negotiations and bodies. At most international negotiations and organizations, the allocation of committee chairmanships, representation on the bureau that directs I.L.M. 818, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-un-en.pdf; Climate Change Convention, supra note 83, art. 1(6).
93. E.g., Biosafety Protocol, supra note 92, art. 37 (allowing for REIO to join as a Party to the Protocol); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 24(1), Dec. 11, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 32, available at http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (providing that the Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification by regional economic integration organizations). Kyoto Protocol, supra, art. 25(4) (providing that an instrument of ratification deposited by a REIO will not count in addition to those deposited by its member States for purposes of bringing the treaty into force).
94. E.g, Kyoto Protocol, supra note 93, art. 22 (expressly allowing REIOs the right, "in matters within their competence," to "exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties" to the Protocol).
95. E.g., Climate Change Convention, supra note 83, arts. 8-10 (establishing a Conference of the Parties; a subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice; and, a subsidiary body for implementation, each open to all Parties). The EU would not enjoy a right to vote in these bodies in addition to the right to vote of its members. United Kingdom and France, members of the EU hold two of the ten nonpermanent seats. 112 EU member countries thus form one-third of the Security Council. EU member states comprise 25% of the parties to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court. 113 EU countries will enjoy ample representation on that court once it forms. It should come as no surprise that the EU and its members readily join international institutions-they can dominate them.
One can argue that the nations of the EU deserve the representation and influence described above. After all, they are a group of nations as opposed to a single state. However, the nations of the EU differ materially from all other blocs of nations. EU members shoulder a legal obligation to form and advocate a unified foreign policy position on a broad range of international matters. The Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) provides that "the Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policies." 114 It further requires member states to "coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences" and to "uphold the common positions in such forums." 115 While other countries can and often do take positions that differ from those of their regional groups, the nations of the EU often cannot and usually do not. In the UN General Assembly, to take one example, the current EU President routinely delivers joint declarations on behalf of the EU member states, and EU members almost always vote together. 116 Evan Bloom explains that diplomats negotiating with EU member states often find that . . . we are either too early or too late. We are too early in that when we approach the European Union to discuss particular positions, we are told that the Commission and members states are not ready to talk with the United States in substance because EU coordination has not been carried out. Then, once the coordination has 112.
Italy 
B. Built-in Exceptions
Exceptional accommodation extends beyond allowing the EU to join agreements and international institutions and to continue to enjoy the benefits of a group of independent states. The EU and its members have vigorously insisted upon and received built-in exceptions whereby the multilateral agreement or international institution treats the EU and its members as a single state for purposes of treaty obligations but as many states for voting on treaty issues and for counting towards the number of states required to render an agreement effective.
For example, during the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol, the EU and its member states insisted that the Protocol's regulations on the transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms not apply to movements within the EU. 120 While the EU and its members served as principal demandeurs of the Protocol and took a lead role in defining the rules that would govern the trade in 117.
Bloom, supra note 78, at 361; accord Fassbender, supra note 12, at 874 (pointing out that, once the EU has adopted a common position, "it can hardly be changed in the course of subsequent negotiations with other UN Member States, especially the other members of WEOG.").
118 genetically modified goods, 121 they promptly sought to exclude themselves from these rules with respect to much of their trade. They argued that EU rules, not those of the Protocol, should govern all trade in genetically modified goods between EU member countries. 122 They proposed that the Protocol include the following exception: "A regional economic integration organization, which itself is a Contracting Party to the Protocol and has a specific legal framework for biosafety, may declare that the Protocol shall not apply to movements within its territory." 123 While proffering a complete exception for itself, the EU proposed that trade undertaken pursuant to non-REIO bilateral and multilateral arrangements meet certain minimum standards. 124 Some Latin American and Caribbean countries objected to the EU's REIO provision. 125 "After intense internal discussion," the EU withdrew its REIO-specific exception and agreed to an exception applicable to all parties for trade undertaken pursuant to bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements. 126 In a similar vein, during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU and its members insisted on the creation of an "EU 
124.
Compilation, supra note 118, at 33. The European Union submitted text on bilateral and regional agreements that could operate in lieu of the procedures set forth in the Protocol, but only if such agreements and arrangements "do not result in a lower level of protection than the one provided for by the Protocol." Id. However, under the EU proposal, this limitation would not apply to multilateral agreements and arrangements that had been entered into prior to the entry into force of the Protocol, such as the existing agreements and arrangements that governed the movement of genetically modified goods within the EU. bubble." 127 Under the bubble concept, reductions in greenhouse gas emissions would be calculated for the EU as a whole. 128 The treaty would thus effectively treat the European Union as a single state for purposes of compliance with the treaty's greenhouse gas reduction requirements.
The EU "called for a uniform target for all industrialized-country parties," with the exception of its own industrialized member states, for whom different targets would be allowed under the EU bubble. 129 The EU bubble would enable certain EU members, such as Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Ireland, actually to increase their greenhouse gas emissions to facilitate their economic development. 130 The bubble would also help the EU countries meet their emissions reduction targets by taking advantage of Germany's large emissions reductions due to eastern Germany's economic restructuring. 131 While the EU and its members insisted upon the ability to effectively trade emissions within the EU, they vigorously opposed emissions trading between other developed nations. The EU and its members maintained that the Kyoto Protocol should freely enable EU countries to swap emissions with each other, with reductions from some countries offsetting increases in emissions in others, but should preclude countries like the United States and New Zealand from enjoying similar flexibility. The EU and its members succeeded in obtaining their bubble. 134 Ultimately, they had to allow emissions trading for other nations, too. 135 The Landmines Convention presents another example of a builtin exclusion to accommodate EU interests. During the negotiation of the Landmines Convention, the EU and its member states pressed to exclude from the scope of the Convention anti-personnel devices used to protect anti-vehicle mines from enemy personnel who would attempt to disarm them. 136 The militaries of EU member states use anti-personnel devices to protect their anti-vehicle mines. 137 The United States military also protects its anti-tank mines with antipersonnel devices through a functionally equivalent, but technically different method. 138 While pressing for its own exclusion, the EU simultaneously opposed a comparable exclusion for the United States. 139 Under the banner of "no loopholes, no exceptions, no 133 .
Breidenich et al., supra note 127, at 324 (emphasis added). Annex I countries are industrialized countries. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 131, at 680. The Kyoto Protocol imposes targets and timetables for these countries to reduce their net emissions of greenhouse gases. Id. The EU and its members initially opposed all emissions trading between non-EU Annex I countries. Id. at 688. Even when they eventually agreed to emissions trading between non-EU Annex I countries, they insisted on capping the amount of trading that these countries could do. Id. at 665.
134. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 93, art. 4 (providing for EU bubble). This provision allows nations other than those of the EU "to bubble" with each other. Id. As with REIO provisions, while facially neutral, this provision was designed specifically for and has been utilized exclusively by the EU. Sanger, supra note 46 ("European nations have similar combination mines, but in their version, the antipersonnel explosives to defend the anti-tank mines are integrated into the rest of the weapon."). The United States protects its anti-vehicle mines with anti-personnel mines that self-destruct after a few weeks so as not to linger and cause casualties after a battle. Id.
139. Telephone Interview with former State Dep't Officer (July 11, 2007) (discussing the negotiation of the Landmines Convention, with which he was familiar).
exclusions," NGOs objected to both the EU and the U.S. exclusions. 140 With its bloc of then-fifteen votes coordinated under a single entity, the EU could easily prevent the adoption of the Convention. 141 The EU's voting power enabled it to secure a built-in exception for its anti-handling devices, 142 which permitted its members to join the Convention. 143
C. Mixed Agreements
In addition to securing built-in exemptions for itself in multilateral agreements, the EU and its members have insisted upon and repeatedly obtained an exceptional mode of treaty to accommodate the unique and evolving status of the European Union-mixed agreements.
These extraordinary and largely unprecedented agreements create an ambiguity as to which party bears responsibility for fulfilling obligations under the treaty. Mixed agreements are treaties that both the EU and some or all of its members can join. 144 In negotiating mixed agreements, other nations may face a confusing gaggle of "one or more of the Communities, one or more of the Communities together with one or more of the . International conventions are usually adopted by consensus. While technically the opposition of one nation can bloc consensus, as a practical matter this rarely happens. Rather, consensus is only blocked when a number of countries object. Given its large number of states, the European Union can always block consensus. Indeed, at the time of the adoption of the Landmines Convention, the fifteen members of European Union comprised over one-third of the forty countries needed to bring the Convention into force. See Landmines Convention, supra note 32, art. 17(1). In mixed agreements, the EU and its members share competence. 146 "Competence" refers to the legal authority to undertake the obligations and exercise the rights set forth in the treaty. 147 Today, most multilateral agreements implicate shared competences between the EU and its member states. The EU Treaty Office's list of agreements joined by the EU indicates that, with a few exceptions, the treaties involve mixed competences between the EU and its members. 148 Most of these agreements cannot be divided into distinct blocks where competences are clearly allocated between the member states and the EU. Rather, the EU and its members "both have competences over parts of the whole." 149 Even if the EU could exercise exclusive competence in a given area, EU members generally resist ceding all treaty power to the EU in a given area, preferring instead to monitor the EU, participate, and preserve their vote in treaty negotiations. 150 Other nations negotiating and entering treaties with the EU and its members usually remain unaware of who bears responsibility for what under the treaty. 151 For example, during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, nations persistently and largely unsuccessfully asked 146 .
Mixed Agreements, supra note 96, at 485.
JONI HELISKOSKI, MIXED AGREEMENTS AS A TECHNIQUE FOR ORGANIZING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES 6 n.21 (2001).
148. See EC Agreements, supra note 88. For example, the EU is a signatory to thirty-one multilateral environmental agreements, all of which involve mixed competences. Rhinard & Kaeding, supra note 121, at 1031-32. Fisheries represent a rare example where the members have transferred all of their competence to the EU such that the EU now joins fisheries agreements in lieu of its members. Hollis, supra note 76, at 157. whether the EU or its members bore responsibility for the important obligations under consideration. 152 Even the EU and its members appeared uncertain during negotiations of their respective competences. 153 These competences can change during the course of a negotiation, as occurred during the negotiation of the FAO Fisheries Agreement. 154 EU competence remains in constant flux because much of the power of the EU remains latent until the EU decides to exercise it by issuing directives. 155 In addition, decisions of the European Court of Justice apportion competences between the Community and its member states. 156 Even where a treaty requires the EU to declare where its competences lie, 157 the EU declaration provides other nations with little comfort. It normally states that the "scope and the exercise of Community competence are, by their nature, subject to continuous development." 158 Few have written on the problems that EU mixed agreements present for other nations. 159 With mixed agreements, other nations often do not know who bears responsibility or liability for a breach. Does responsibility lie with the EU? Does the member state where the violation occurred bear liability? The EU and its members maintain that, ordinarily, the question of which among them bears responsibility constitutes an internal EU matter. 160 The EU and its
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Damro & Luaces-Méndez, supra note 128, at 4 (describing how legal uncertainties as to the relationship between the EU and member states led "to numerous questions on the part of third parties about which actor-the EU or each member state" bore responsibility for implementing the issues under consideration during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol).
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See generally Cremona, supra note 151 (discussing international responsibility under mixed agreements).
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See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 76, at 158 (noting that member states successfully challenged the authority of the EC to enter into human rights agreements before the European Court of Justice).
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In an effort to alleviate some of the confusion, some treaties now provide that the REIO should declare what powers it exercises for purposes of that treaty. Cremona, supra note 151, at 21. Article 24(3) of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, requires REIOs to declare at the time that they join the Protocol "the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by" the Protocol and to inform the Depository of "any substantial modification in the extent of their competence." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 93, art. 24(3).
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Steinberger, supra note 149, at 838. While much has been written about the internal problems that mixed agreements present for the EU and its members, few scholars seem to worry about the problems that these agreements present for everyone else. Id. Steinberger discusses some of these problems in the context of the WTO. Id.
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See Cremona, supra note 151, at 16 ("Whether the Community or the Member State actually implements the agreement will depend on 'the state of Community Law for the time being in the areas affected by the provisions of the agreement.'" (quoting Case 104/81, Hauptzollampt Mainz v. Kupferberg, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, issue 2, ¶ 12)). Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has opined that, in members expect other nations to exercise patience as Brussels goes through time-consuming internal gyrations, legal analysis, and negotiations with EU members with respect both to implementing treaty obligations and to addressing breaches.
These delays, however, can impose significant costs on other countries. In the case of some agreements, such as those in the areas of trade and aviation, the aggrieved country can suffer millions of dollars in damages for every day that a violation occurs. 161 Some have argued that in the event of a breach of an obligation contained in a mixed agreement, the EU and its members bear joint and several liability. 162 The aggrieved party could then initiate compliance measures against each, and each would shoulder liability. The EU resists this suggestion. 163 The issue of liability arose in the recent Air Transport Agreement between the EU and its members and the United States (the Open Skies Plus Agreement). 164 Disputes over the Open Skies Plus Agreement illustrate the liability issues that arise in mixed agreements. The Agreement treats the airlines of all European Union member countries as "Community airlines." 165 For most purposes, the Agreement treats the EU member countries as one territorial entity, just like the United States. 166 Should an entity within the United States, such as an airport or state, violate a provision of the Open Skies Plus Agreement, then the EU and its members could conceivably retaliate-i.e., impose countermeasuresmixed agreements, the apportionment of competences between member states and the EU constitutes "an internal question." Id. at 20.
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See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 149, at 859-62 (concluding that the EU and its members should bear joint and several liability for breaches of the WTO Agreements).
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The Commission likes to see the EC as the first port of call, in order to minimize the risk that a Member State and a third state might enter into bilateral negotiations or even proceedings which might have the effect of deciding issues relating to the interpretation of the agreement and to the scope of EC competence.
Id. In multilateral agreements where the EU has filed a declaration of competences, joint and several liability does not apply. Id. at 21-22. However, in the absence of a declaration or its inconclusiveness, "the authorities differ as to whether international responsibility should be apportioned between the Community and its member States according to their respective competences, or whether the Community and Member States could be regarded as jointly and severally responsible in international law for the whole agreement." Id. Overall, responsibility for violations of agreements with the EU member countries remains unclear. While the EU and its members always know what countries they can hold responsible for implementation and breaches of international agreements, other countries do not enjoy similar comfort in their treaty relations with the EU. This situation is unlikely to correct itself over time. The EU and its members have both legal and political incentive to maintain the ambiguity manifest in mixed agreements, and the number of mixed agreements will continue to mushroom.
The EU and its members take pride in their historic union. They expect other nations to accommodate their exciting experiment and its attendant legal irregularities. As Alan Rosas, former Principal Legal Adviser for the European Commission, matter-of-factly said: "The European Union being a hybrid conglomerate situated somewhere between a State and an intergovernmental organisation, it is only natural that its external relations in general and treaty practice in particular should not be straightforward." 168 Other countries simply must accept as facts of life mixed agreements, representation at international conferences by both the EU and its member states, and the maintenance of embassies by the EU in addition to those of the member states. 169 Its command of a tremendous number of votes enables the EU and its members to obtain both the structural and substantive accommodations that they desire in a treaty. ultimately have to abandon their hypocritical positions and extend similar substantive accommodation to other nations, as they did in the Kyoto Protocol and in the Biosafety Protocol, the EU and its members always obtain their "must haves." 170 In contrast, the United States-with its single vote-finds itself unable to secure legal accommodation in a multilateral agreement even if its proffered accommodation would apply to other nations in a similar situation. The U.S.-proposed exclusion for the DMZ obviously applied solely to the DMZ, but this tailored exclusion arose out of the restrictive dynamic of the Ottawa process. 171 The United States would have accepted an exclusion that encompassed other countries. 172 In fact, the 1996 UN Protocol on Landmines to which the United States is party has a general exclusion for mines in controlled fields. 173 This exclusion covers the DMZ as well as the China-Russia border and the India-Pakistan border. In the case of the International Criminal Court, the United States sought to preserve the International Law Commission's original concept of the Court as subject to the control of the Security Council. 174 The United States sits on the Council, but so do other nations-the United States' desired accommodation would have applied to those similarly situated nations with seats on the Security Council.
Roughly to analogize the position of the United States to that of the European Union, imagine if the United States could, for purposes of international negotiations, become a group of fifty states. Like the European Union, the United States, when speaking at international negotiations, could intervene along the following lines: "The United States, on behalf of its fifty member states, proposes that the Landmines Convention include a nine-year grace period for the demining of the DMZ and, in addition to excluding anti-handling devices, exclude self-destructing anti-personnel mines when used with anti-vehicle mines. Without such provisions, our fifty member states will not join the Convention."
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IV. DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXCEPTIONALISM: COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITIES
Just as the United States sought an exception in the Landmines Convention to address its historical obligations and special needs in the DMZ, developing countries routinely and increasingly seek to except themselves from uniform international norms in environmental agreements and in trade agreements, arguing that they need such exceptions in order to address their special needs and history. Developing countries argue that they have overwhelming socio-economic concerns, including the pressing need to alleviate abject poverty in their societies, that take precedence over environmental protection and that require differentiated environmental standards and trading rules. 175 They further emphasize that they lack the resources and the technical capabilities to implement environmental protection standards to the same degree as developed countries. 176 Some note that developed countries freely exploited their resources and natural habitats on their road to development, and believe that it is unfair for international rules now to constrain the freedom of poor countries to use their environments to advance economically. 177 Finally, developing countries argue that developed countries should shoulder a higher share of the costs of environmental protection as they created a disproportionate amount of the world's environmental problems. 178 Overall, as Christopher Stone notes, "[t]he environment is emerging as the most fertile field for nonuniform obligations." 179 The concept that developing countries should enjoy a lesser legal burden has acquired two names: "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CDR) in the environmental arena and "special and differential treatment" (SDT) in the trade context. 180 In environmental agreements, "differentiated" means that legal obligations to address common environmental threats should differ among nations, with developing nations ordinarily assuming lower burdens than developed ones. 181 Agenda 21, adopted by nations at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, calls upon states to "take into account the different situations and capabilities of countries" when designing international standards. 182 The lesser burden imposed upon developing nations, or the special accommodation afforded them, manifests itself in treaties in a number of ways. A treaty might specify a lower level of obligation for developing countries. For example, the Kyoto Protocol completely exempts developing countries from any obligation to reduce or to cap future emissions of greenhouse gases. 183 The 1994 Desertification Convention imposes obligations on developed countries that it does not impose upon developing countries. 184 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea contains at least ten provisions that accord preferential treatment to developing nations. 185 For example, Article 61, which addresses the conservation of the living resources of the sea, qualifies the obligation of coastal states "to maintain or restore populations of harvested species" based on "the special requirements of developing 180 .
Compare States." 186 Article 62 exhorts coastal states to take special account of "the requirements of developing States" when allocating access to fishing rights in their Exclusive Economic Zones. 187 While the Convention obligates nations that exploit minerals and gas beyond their continental shelf to contribute to an international fund, it exempts certain developing countries from the payment obligation. 188 In the alternative, a treaty that imposes identical obligations on all parties might offer certain countries a more favorable time frame for implementation. Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or anytime thereafter within ten years of the date of entry into force of the Protocol shall, in order to meet its basic domestic needs, be entitled to delay its compliance with the control . . . by ten years after that specified in those paragraphs. 202 Article 8 on in situ conservation, for example, obligates parties to establish protected areas and to "regulate or manage biological resources important for the conservation of biological diversity" only "as far as possible and as appropriate." 203 Even if a treaty does not expressly differentiate between parties, Susan Biniaz explains that "countries will later assert that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities dictates that compliance regimes distinguish between developed and developing countries." 204 This amounts to "a kind of ex post facto effort to change commitments that were not differentiated when they were negotiated into differentiated commitments by virtue of saying that it is permissible for developing countries not to implement these commitments, because of the principle." 205 So widespread has CDR become that some suggest that this differentiation in legal obligation, or what could be called developing country exceptionalism, may constitute an emerging principle of customary international law. 206 Several developing countries have even argued that CDR constitutes a principle of international law that selectively relieves them from WTO standards. 207 Most scholars and international lawyers do not believe that CDR has risen to a principle of customary international law. 208 Nonetheless, it has "significantly affected international legal discourse." 209 In the trade realm, "differential and more favourable treatment for developing countries" is "deeply embedded" in both the negotiation and the implementation of multilateral trade agreements. 210 In 1955, parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) revised the Agreement to allow developing countries to impose trade restrictions to support infant industries and to avoid the GATT's prohibition against quantitative restrictions. 211 In 1971, the parties established a waiver that allowed members to promulgate preferential tariff rates that favored developing countries. 212 By the 1970s, according to the GATT's chief economist, Jan Tumlir, "practice under the General Agreement [had] become so lenient that hardly a substantive obligation could be said to exist . . . which could not be waived or substantially attenuated in favour of a developing country." 213 In 1979, the parties adopted a declaration that enunciated and endorsed the concept of special and differential treatment for developing countries in the multilateral system. 214 The 1994 WTO Agreements contain more than one hundred provisions that extend special and differential treatment to developing countries. 215 Since its birth in 1995, the WTO has issued scores of declarations that provide for special and differential treatment. 216 Developing countries continue to press for differential and more favorable treatment in the trade regime. 217 They do so not because they disdain international norms but because, as they stated in a 2002 joint communiqué to the WTO Committee on Trade and Development, they believe that they "experience peculiar problems, which constrain their beneficial participation in the multilateral trading system. Fundamental to these are structural imbalances in their economies as well as distortions arising from historical trading relations . . . [which] undermine productive and trade capacity of these countries." 218 As they further explained: "It follows that developing countries cannot address their development challenges and participate meaningfully in the international trade system, if they assume the same types and levels of obligations as envisaged in the Uruguay Round Agreements . . . . On the contrary, they must be accorded S&D treatment." 219 Many will likely object to the comparison of CDR and SDT to the vilified legal exceptionalism of the United States. The need of developing countries to improve their standards of living and their proportionately lower level of contribution to global environmental degradation may be seen as having greater moral purchase than U.S. perceptions of special security obligations, and constitutional and federalism issues. 220 Furthermore, other countries find it politically expedient to accommodate developing countries' demands in environmental agreements to obtain these countries' accession to multilateral environmental treaties. 221 Other countries have not found it similarly expedient to accommodate U.S. needs. This reticence stems in key part from the United States' exercise of only one vote at most multilateral treaty negotiations. However, it may also owe to the United States' compliance with agreements that it does not join, such as human rights treaties and environmental the burdens of the Kyoto Protocol but also asked for subsidies to compensate them for financial losses that they might incur due to the Protocol. 229 CDR also results in international standards that deter developed countries from joining. For example, the exemption for developing countries, including major polluters like China, from any obligation to limit future greenhouse gas emissions meant that other countries had to shoulder an even greater greenhouse gas reduction burden than if all polluters played a role in limiting emissions. 230 Stone has shown that, as of 2002, the United States emitted 23.81% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions. 231 However, with countries like China and India exempted from Kyoto, the United States' share jumps to 51.60% of the emissions of countries subject to the 2002 Kyoto greenhouse gas targets. 232 This increased burden deterred the United States from joining. 233 Developing country exceptionalism further has a corruptive influence when the widespread practice in environmental agreements of tying developing countries' compliance to the receipt of funds from developed countries 234 turns international standards into a fundraising source. For example, both the 1992 Framework on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity provide that the successful implementation by developing country parties of their treaty obligations will depend on the effective implementation by developed country parties of their financial resources and technology commitments. 235 Developing countries have an economic incentive to raise standards with the expectation that others will pay them to implement these standards. Furthermore, the expectation that others will pay for the implementation of environmental regulations causes developing countries to propose and support unrealistic standards that countries who shoulder the responsibility for the costs of their implementation cannot afford. For example, during the negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol, developing countries consistently argued for a high and costly level of protection that exceeded that which even a rich country like the United States had in place domestically. Developing countries argued that the Protocol should require importing countries to review every shipment of a genetically modified organism, such as a strain of genetically modified corn, even if that genetically modified strain had already been approved in their countries. These countries then maintained that developed countries should pay developing countries for the cost of implementing the Protocol's regulatory regime. 236 China's posture on climate change perhaps best illustrates the problematic side of developing country exceptionalism. The International Energy Agency expects China to surpass the United States as the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide by 2009. 237 As a developing country, China enjoys exemption from the Kyoto Protocol's requirements. When the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, China praised it and called on all "developed countries" which had not done so "to sign the protocol as soon as possible so as to fulfill the measures taken by the international community to cope with climate change." 238 Ten months later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated China's support for the Protocol: "China supports the earnest implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in light of the fundamental principle of the Pact. . . . [The] Kyoto Protocol sets the principle of common and differentiated responsibilities. China upholds the principle." 239 Despite China's imminent emergence as the world's greatest emitter of greenhouse gases and the expectation that developing countries will be responsible for most of the increase in global carbon dioxide levels over the coming years, China consistently resists any limits on its emissions and those of developing countries. 240 Instead, China repeatedly calls for even tighter limits on developed countries' emissions. 241
V. CONCLUSION
The present rhetoric and emphasis on U.S. exceptionalism is overstated at best and misguided and even dangerous at worst. First, it provides cover for European nations that, at times, misuse international law to isolate the United States in order to compete economically and politically rather than to address substantive global problems. 242 Second, the characterization of the United States as an inherent objector to international law discourages meaningful discourse with the United States and leads to weaker international agreements. Rather than negotiating with the United States to see if they can accommodate its needs, nations-prompted at times by influential NGOs-often formulate international norms that obtain high levels of accession by small and medium states or by states with minimal de jure or de facto compliance burdens. 243 These nations then hope to pressure the United States into treaties to which the United States objects by decrying the United States as exceptionalist. 244 This approach has not worked, as the United States continues to resist bad bargains. But leaving a powerful country outside of a treaty regime can weaken the treaty as a practical matter, notwithstanding the large number of treaty members.
Third, the present dynamic that ostracizes a country that does not join international agreements leads a country that objects to certain treaties to work against them. Prominent scholars have criticized the United States not only for refusing to join international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, but also for actively working to undermine these treaties by encouraging other nations not to join. 245 Yet no longer can a nation adopt a live-and-let-live approach to certain multilateral treaties. Even if a country does not join, the treaty can hurt it by generating international ostracism. This potential harm gives the threatened nation a strong incentive to undermine the treaty. The rhetoric of U.S. exceptionalism thus presents a double danger to international law: it isolates the United States and can lead to less effective agreements without U.S. support, and it also causes the United States to actively oppose certain international agreements.
This Article, in showing that most nations seek exceptional legal accommodation in certain situations, lays a foundation for future work on the proper place for exceptionalism in international law. Legal exceptionalism may not always be bad. Situations exist where countries have exceptional needs for which the international community should consider special accommodation. The United States' quest for a solution for the Korean Peninsula in the Landmines Convention falls into this category. Europe's need for at least some international accommodation for its historic union also deserves a sympathetic ear. The pursuit by developing countries, particularly the least developed ones, for lower levels of obligation in environmental and trade agreements has traction in many, though not all, situations.
In contrast, status-based exceptionalism-in which a country or a group of countries obtains special accommodation or, conversely, faces special opprobrium based on inherent status or positionrepresents an unacceptable form of exceptionalism. The United States does not deserve legal exceptions simply because of its superpower status. Similarly, the rest of the world cannot be expected to consistently diminish the strength of human rights agreements-such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child's prohibition on the execution of minors-to oblige the U.S. federal system, which leaves many powers to her several states. Nations should not persistently accommodate the European Union and its members just because they constitute an evolving union. Developing countries should not enjoy an across-the-board presumption of lesser legal obligation in environmental and trade agreements. An indicator of this type of status-based exceptionalism can be found when a country seeks an accommodation for itself but opposes that accommodation for other similarly situated countries. The conduct of the European Union and its members in the Biosafety Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol exemplify this type of exceptionality. A country's leveraging of a bona fide special circumstance to obtain unfair advantage or benefit that exceeds what it needs to address the circumstance at hand also represents an unacceptable form of exceptionalism. The complete exemption from climate change disciplines sought and obtained by countries like Brazil, China, India, and Saudi Arabia that allows them to freely emit greenhouse gases to their economic advantage exemplifies this type of unacceptable exceptionalism. In these cases the exceptions sought go well beyond special needs and yield an unfair advantage that degrades the environment and undermines the likelihood that other polluters will join the agreement. The European Union and its members' legal fusion of their foreign policy while maintaining a commanding number of votes at international negotiations extends beyond the reasonable accommodation necessary to enable the Union to function as part of the international community. Rather, it gives one international entity an unfair advantage and disproportionate influence in setting international norms.
Also suspect is the European Union's practice of hiding the ball on the division of competences that enables it to create uncertain compliance obligations in multilateral agreements. This practice often exceeds the actual needs of the Union and its members and instead works to their legal, political, and economic advantage. A country's or a group of countries' use of international law to bind other nations while excluding themselves represents the most problematic form of legal exceptionalism. Here, a country or a group of countries uses international law not to bridge gaps between nations or to address global problems but as a sword against other countries. Little tolerance should be afforded to countries that participate in negotiations to develop norms for others while simultaneously seeking to exempt themselves from most of a treaty's obligations or core requirements by using exemptions or reservations-or by having no intent to comply with a treaty's requirements in the first place.
Countries that ratchet up international norms and then demand funding for their implementation similarly engage in a negotiation of obligations for others.
The present focus on U.S. exceptionalism forms part of an overall emphasis on the generation of treaties, with over 5,400 multilateral agreements in place today, 246 and an obsession with countries' accession to them, sometimes at the expense of meaningful solutions to substantive global problems. International law has come to be viewed as a global good in and of itself 247 : the more, the better. This orientation allows countries to gain international esteem by joining agreements, even if they do not comply with them. 248 It allows nations like the United States to avoid seriously tackling global issues through concrete action by diverting attention to why it has not joined a treaty. 249 If the United States' climate change posture is shameful, it is not because of its refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol, a fundamentally flawed agreement, but because of its refusal to take steps to abate its emission of greenhouse gases. As the world moves further into the twenty-first century, the time has come to take a more mature look at the place of exceptionalism in international law.
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